Thursday, April 13, 2023

On Delegation (The Core US Military Strategy) and Future Military Conflicts

Greetings friends, So we have another burst of inspiration here this time on core strategic and tactical principles in the US Military and how they interact with the modern military thesis vis-a-vis Ukraine, Taiwan, and the Philippines. A very prevalent thought in the US Military is delegation which works extremely well for small tactical groups from JEB Stuart to the Navy Seals but does not aid in overall strategic decision making or willingness to finish a long, bloody (and potentially tedious) campaign successfully, as evidenced by the failures in Vietnam and Afghanistan. This doctrine is older than WWII but WWII was not fought in this vein especially and the Korean War also wasn't (probably due to Macarthur's influence), I suspect the Korean War would not have been a stalemate if the general strategic outlook was focused on small tactical units and so on instead of a series of massive battles a la WWII; most likely North Korea would have won decisively. So in a roundabout way I guess I'm defending Macarthur here despite the silliness of nuking China.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... In the case of Ukraine we do have delegation working successfully (at least at the moment, 4/13/2023) but there is also a cohesive strategic military objective on the part of the Ukranians that is working in their favor so despite the massive losses on both sides and the warfare style not seen for 65-70 years (and the diplomacy not seen for over a hundred); the case of of the Kharkiv offensive is generally where you can see delegation working well again reminiscent of a Civil War small unit campaign; in general the war is very similar in scope to the US Civil War, there's also the notions of brother vs brother as well as we must defend to survive and massive casualties with trench warfare; but for the time being the war is still going relatively well for Ukraine; time will tell whether that is the final conclusion or not.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. As far as Taiwan there is definitely a much more jingoistic approach from the media and the Presidency/administration focusing on the threat that China poses but I don't think there is a particularly strong willingness to fight and die personally for individuals born in the post 9/11 world; especially not compared to China (or India) who have a roughly 70% willingess to fight compared to the US' 44% (2015 Gallup Poll); ultimately China and Russia are not especially comparable as opponents because one is a transcendent power and the other is a clearly declining (especially demographically) power. If China simply waits like 10-20 years then they may get Taiwan without fighting, however there is enormous prestige on the line were they to win a war, essentially completely disconnecting the European and American apparatus from the rest of the world (or at least the non Western hemisphere, it does seem like Brasil is more likely to align with the "Global South" (formerly phrased as "Third World") and probably splitting the world into two or three globalization economic spheres instead of just one. China can't really get more economically powerful but they can certainly get more militarily powerful, strategically powerful, and prestigiously powerful; so their objective set will likely be more reflect of Putin's world view then the post Cold War world view (which obviously has proven inaccurate at this point)................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... At present the odds of American/Taiwanese victory in a defensive conflict are fairly high, as much as 80%; but even if the event that China lost the war they would probably be willing to go again whereas the US losing multiple Aircraft Carriers and say 20,000 men would have a devestating effect on the home front; but even if China lost 200k-300k soldiers that's still a relatively small part of their population and they have the cohesive societal outlook necessary for a longer, bloodier campaign (as does Russia incidentally though possibly not the raw resources or manpower); after China does acquire Taiwan in some way (which might take 25 years and may or may not be extremely bloody or bloodless) they will almost certainly go after the Phillippines immediately (which they are already making plays at it in diplomatic/economic ways) because the Philippines are the linchpin of the entire Pacific Theater just as they were in WWII; the Philippines are the most important strategic piece of territory in the world by far and thus will continue to be a conflict center between Great Powers moving forward; it is abundantly clear that this kind of conflict is very real and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future just as it had been for hundreds of years before 1989.